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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past several decades, economic inequality
in the United States has grown rapidly. Not only is economic inequal-
ity in this country at its highest level since the years before the Great
Depression,' but the United States also continues to be among the
most economically unequal countries in the industrialized world.
While the very affluent in this country continue to increase their share
of the country's income and wealth, the middle class has been
squeezed, and record numbers of Americans find themselves in
poverty.2
1. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 5 (2012).
2. Kevin Fagan, Federal Funding Cut Hurts S.F. Food Bank, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarealarticle/Federal-funding-cut-hurts-S-F-Food-Bank-3929513.php
(indicating that 49.1 million Americans are now in poverty).
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Not only is there dramatic economic inequality in the United
States at this time, but there has also been reduced intergenerational
economic mobility in the United States. This increasingly has resulted
in what social scientists refer to as stickiness, at the top and bottom of
the income distribution, which means that it is increasingly likely that
children born to very affluent and very poor families will replicate
their parents' economic status when they become adults. Further-
more, though measuring economic mobility is an inherently back-
wards-looking type of analysis as one must compare the economic
status of people who have been adults for a long period of time to the
economic status of their parents during a similarly long period of their
adult years, there are many reasons to believe that children in our
society today will experience less economic mobility than their parents
did.
Without question, millions of Americans of all races have suf-
fered economically over the course of the past several years. Never-
theless, by one measure, African Americans and Hispanics as a whole
were downwardly mobile and net losers in terms of their income sta-
tus during the period of 2001-2011, while whites were net winners.3
Not only has the Great Recession hit African Americans and Hispan-
ics particularly hard economically but also the economic decline for
these groups started several years before the official beginning of this
recession.' A review of any number of economic measures including
wealth,' unemployment,6 and poverty' yields evidence of this down-
3. Fewer, Poorer, Gloomier: The Lost Decade of the Middle Class, PEw RESEARCH CTR. 12
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/pew-social-trends-lost-decade-of-
the-middle-class.pdf (determining net winners and losers in terms of changes in income status
since 2001 by analyzing the difference in a group's percentage in the upper-income category
from the change in a group's percentage in the lower-income category).
4. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Struggle for Racial Justice: The Personal, the Political, and
... the Economic, 44 LAW & Soc'v REV. 495, 498 (2010); Richard Lempert, A Personal Odyssey
Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States: 1948-2009, 44 LAw & Soc'y REV. 431,
442-44 (2010).
5. See infra notes 39 to 47 and accompanying text.
6. In 2011, the white unemployment rate was 7.9 percent; the black unemployment rate
was 15.8 percent; and the Hispanic unemployment rate was 11.5 percent. U.S. BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY, 2011, at 41 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2011.pdf. In contrast,
in 2001, the white unemployment rate was 4.2%, the black unemployment rate was 8.6%, and
the Hispanic unemployment rate was 6.6 percent. Id.
7. In 2011, 12.8% of whites lived in poverty; 27.6% of blacks lived in poverty; and 25.3%
of Hispanics lived in poverty. People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2010 and 2011, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/datalincpovhlthl2011/table3.
pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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ward mobility for African Americans and Hispanics relative to white
Americans.
Part I presents a summary of the overall trends in income and
wealth inequalities in the United States. This section also establishes
that the United States is more economically unequal than most other
industrialized countries. Part II establishes that as economic inequal-
ity in the United States has increased dramatically, intergenerational
economic mobility has fallen. As a result, the likelihood that those
born to the more affluent will be affluent themselves as adults and
that those born into poverty will remain in poverty when they become
adults has increased considerably over the course of the past few de-
cades. Part III establishes the fact, notwithstanding the Occupy Wall
Street movement, that there has been very little sustained, broad-
based protest in the United States in recent decades pertaining to is-
sues of economic fairness and equality. This section identifies some of
the factors, which suggest that it is unlikely that a mass social move-
ment will emerge and endure over a long period of time to address
economic inequality and poverty. Part IV claims that greater eco-
nomic equality in the United States is achievable only if policymakers
make fundamental changes in certain key areas of public policy. Al-
though it is unlikely that the legal system can serve as a primary tool
to reduce economic inequality in any substantial way, there are a
number of legal strategies and initiatives that lawyers and legal orga-
nizations, including law schools, could pursue in an effort to increase
economic equality and security for many Americans, including for
many persons of color.
I. OVERALL TRENDS IN INCOME AND
WEALTH INEQUALITIES
Since the mid-1970s, income inequality in the United States has
grown dramatically. Growth in income inequality has been particu-
larly pronounced at the very top of the income distribution. Though
the distribution of income has become more and more unequal, at
present, wealth is even more highly concentrated among those at the
top of the wealth distribution than income is among the highest in-
come earners. Further, in our country there are persistent and dra-
matic racial income and wealth gaps, though the racial wealth gap is
particularly galling. Furthermore, the economic developments in our
country over the past several decades that have resulted in dramatic
income and wealth inequalities appear to have resulted in much less
[VOL. 56:849852
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intergenerational economic mobility in the past quarter century than
was the case in the aftermath of World War II through the 1970s. This
decreased mobility calls into question a fundamental underpinning of
the notion of the American dream.
A. Trends in Income Inequality
Between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s, family in-
come roughly doubled in inflation-adjusted terms for families,
whether these families were at the top, middle, or bottom of the in-
come distribution.' To this end, according to the United States Cen-
sus Bureau (Census Bureau), between 1947 and 1975, family income
in the bottom four quintiles of the income distribution increased be-
tween 90.3% and 99.2%, while family income for those in the top five
percent of the income distribution increased by 85.5%.9 As will be
discussed below, this general pattern of equitable income accumula-
tion during this period masks significant income earning gaps along
racial and gender lines.
The period of general shared prosperity for the majority of
American families came to an end beginning in the early- to mid-
1970s.10 By the end of the 1970s, a pattern began to emerge in which
those in the lower to middle rungs of the income ladder experienced
only modest income growth while those at the top of the income dis-
tribution experienced much more rapid income growth.n This pattern
has not only persisted over the course of the past three decades but
also has intensified quite dramatically, with only very limited
exceptions.12
Between 1975 and 2010, according to the Census Bureau, those
families in the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution exper-
ienced a 3.7% and 13.2% increase in family income, respectively.13 In
8. Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 7-8, http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-28-llpov.pdf (last modi-
fied Oct. 23, 2012).
9. Percentage Change in Family Income 1947-1975 and 1975-2010, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,
[hereinafter Percentage Change] http://www.russellsage.org/sites/alllfiles/chartbook/real-median-
individual-income-by-race-large.jpg (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
10. Id.
11. Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007, CONG. BUDGET
OFF. 2-3 (Oct. 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-House
holdIncome.pdf.
12. U.S. Cong., Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 17 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/at
tachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf.
13. Percentage Change, supra note 9.
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contrast, families in the second highest quintile of the income distribu-
tion experienced a 39.3% increase in their incomes, while families in
the top five percent of the income distribution experienced a 56.7%
increase in their incomes.14 Using more comprehensive and sophisti-
cated measures of income,'5 the Congressional Budget Office's
(CBO) analysis of after-tax household income growth between 1979
and 2007 is consistent with the Census Bureau's analysis of income
growth for the period between 1975 and 2010 in terms of demonstrat-
ing that income inequality in this country grew sharply during this pe-
riod. However, the CBO's analysis provides some finer grain analysis.
Although the CBO report indicates that income for households in
the lowest quintile grew somewhat more than the Census Bureau re-
port indicates, the CBO report demonstrates that income at the very
top of the income distribution grew at an incredible rate. To this end,
the CBO report indicates that after-tax income growth for the lowest
quintile was 18%, which is almost 15% higher than the Census Bu-
reau's analysis of income growth-using a different methodology to
calculate income-for the lowest quintile. 6 Further, the CBO report
demonstrates that after-tax income for those households in the 81st
through 99th percentiles grew by 65% between 1979 and 2007. Much
more dramatically, after-tax income for those households in the top
1% of the income distribution grew by 275%, which means that
household income for these extremely high income earners nearly
quadrupled between 1975 and 2007.17
Furthermore, although federal taxes and government transfer
payments are progressive in the United States, in the past several
years they have had only a very small impact on reducing the concen-
tration of income. For example, in 2007, the top 1% of households in
terms of income received 21% of overall income before federal taxes
and transfer payments; these households received 17% of overall in-
come after federal taxes and transfers. Similarly, the top 81 to 99% of
households in terms of income received 39% of overall income before
federal taxes and transfer payments; these households received 35%
of overall income after federal taxes and transfers. Furthermore, due
14. Id.
15. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 8.
16. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 3.
17. Id. The CBO is able to provide a better analysis of income at the top of the income
distribution in part because the Census Bureau's information is more limited information with
respect to income at the top of the income distribution for both methodological and policy rea-
sons. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 3.
[VOL. 56:849854
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to changes in federal tax law and in government transfer programs
over the course of the past several years, federal taxes and federal
transfer programs now have less of a redistributive effect on market
income" than federal taxes and transfers had on redistributing market
income in 1979. These developments have resulted in increased in-
come inequality.1 9
As compared to other major industrialized countries, the United
States has one of the highest levels of income inequality after account-
ing for the redistributive effect of federal taxes and government trans-
fers.2 0 In fact, though a couple of industrialized countries, such as
Belgium and France, have a higher degree of pretax income inequality
than the United States, after-tax income inequality in the United
States is much higher than it is in most other industrialized countries
including Belgium and France because taxation in this country redis-
tributes far less income than it does in most other industrialized coun-
tries.2 1 Furthermore, a cross-country study of income inequality from
the mid-1970s to 2000 revealed that in the United States income ine-
quality continued to rise from the mid-1970s through 2000.22 In con-
trast, in most other industrialized countries, levels of inequality rose
for a number of years but then slowed in the latter years of the period
under study.23 Furthermore, the United States ranks amongst the de-
veloped countries with the most unequal distributions of income in
part because the federal government in the United States provides far
less government support to its citizens with respect to public services,
higher education, pensions, and other forms of support than do gov-
ernments in other developed countries.24
18. Market income includes income earned from labor, business income, capital gains, capi-
tal income, and other sources of income including any income an individual receives in retire-
ment in consideration of past services. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at II.
19. See id.
20. Linda Levine, The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and International
Comparisons, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 9-10 (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42
400.pdf.
21. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 257-58 (2007).
22. Levine, supra note 20, at 9.
23. Id.
24. Tami Luhby, Global Income Inequality: Where the U.S. Ranks, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8,
2011, 3:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/08/news/economy/global-income-inequality/index
.htm. Other reasons that account for the exceptionally high level of income inequality in the
United States than in other developed countries are the comparatively steeper decline in union
membership in the United States and the greater restrictions that countries in Europe place
upon executive compensation which results in lower levels of executive compensation in Europe
than in the United States. Id.
2013] 855
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B. Trends in Wealth Inequality
Family wealth, also known as net worth, is the gross assets a fam-
ily owns minus the financial liabilities the family has incurred. 25 As-
sets fall into two categories: consumable assets, which include equity
in homes and vehicles; and financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, mu-
tual funds, 401(k) accounts, rental property, the equity in a business,
and assets one owns that are held by a bank or other financial institu-
tion.26 Liabilities may be secured, such as is the case with mortgages
on real estate one owns or vehicle loans, or unsecured, such as credit
card debt or student loans.27
The discourse about economic inequality in our society tends to
predominately focus upon income inequality. Nevertheless, wealth in-
equality in the United States is substantially more concentrated than
income inequality.28 Given that there is substantial overlap between
those at the top of the income and wealth distributions, overall eco-
nomic inequality as measured by the economic resources under the
control of the very well-off is greater than one might glean from ana-
lyzing income or wealth inequality in isolation.
In 2007, those in the top 1% of the income distribution received
21% of all income; however, the top 1% of the wealth distribution
held 35% of wealth in this country.2 9 More broadly, though the top
10% of the income distribution received 47% of income in 2007, the
top 10% of the wealth distribution in 2007 held 74% of our country's
wealth.3 o Although these data clearly demonstrate that the distribu-
tion of wealth is much more skewed in favor of the very wealthy than
income is skewed in favor of those at the top of the income distribu-
tion, income inequality in this country has been increasing much more
rapidly than wealth inequality.'
25. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 10.
26. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEw
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 106 (1997).
27. Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispan-
iCS, PEw RESEARCH CR. 7 (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-
Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
28. Stone et al., supra note 8, at 10.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10.
[VOL. 56:849856
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C. Racial Income and Wealth Gaps
1. Racial Income Gaps
In addition to substantial income and wealth inequalities among
those differentially situated on the income and wealth distributions,
significant gaps exist in terms of both distributions when one com-
pares median non-Hispanic white income with median African Amer-
ican and Hispanic incomes. These gaps have been longstanding,
though the income gap between white households and African Ameri-
can households has remained constant since the early 1970s, while the
income gap between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanic households
has increased slightly during this same time period. In 2011, the ratio
of black to non-Hispanic white household income was 0.58, a ratio
which has stayed constant in terms of statistical relevancy for the past
four decades.3 2 In comparison, the ratio in 2011 for Hispanic to non-
Hispanic white household income was 0.70, which represents a statisti-
cally significant decline from the 1972 ratio of 0.74.33 For 2011, black
real median individual income was 79% of white real median individ-
ual income, and Hispanic real median individual income was 72% of
white real median individual income. 3 4
Non-Hispanic white households, African American households,
and Hispanic households each had lower household incomes in 2011
than each of these groups had just before the 2001 recession. Even so,
the 7% decline in non-Hispanic white household income during this
period was lower than the decline was for the other groups. In con-
trast, African American households have experienced a 16.8% decline
in household income during this period, which was by far the largest
decline for any racial or ethnic group during this period. 5
2. Racial Wealth Gaps
More than fifteen years ago, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro
published a groundbreaking book that attempted to reframe an im-
portant aspect of the economic debate on racial inequality by shining
the light on the vast racial wealth gap between African Americans and
32. Carmen DeNavas-walt et al., Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 9 (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-
243.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Percentage Change, supra note 9.
35. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 32, at 8.
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white Americans.3 6 Using one measure of wealth, Oliver and Shapiro
demonstrated that the median white household in 1988 had approxi-
mately twelve times the net worth of the median black household."
Given that most academic study and policy analysis about economic
inequality previously had tended to focus on the significant and persis-
tent income inequality between African Americans and whites, it ap-
peared that Oliver and Shapiro's book could serve as a catalyst in
fundamentally transforming the academic study of and public policy
responses to racial economic inequality. In fact, the book received a
very positive reception from a diverse group of readers, including
from some people and groups in important positions of power in cer-
tain sectors. For example, the Ford Foundation has provided support
to a number of individuals and organizations that have been working
to address the racial wealth gap in one way or another. Among these
organizations is the Insight Center for Community and Economic De-
velopment, which has developed an ongoing initiative called the Clos-
ing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative."
In spite of all of the efforts that academics, foundations, nonprofit
organizations, government, and others have made over the past fifteen
years or so to narrow the racial wealth gap, a gap that was already
quite alarming fifteen years ago, the racial wealth gap has become
dramatically larger during this period. By one measure, the white-to-
black median wealth ratio increased from eleven to one in 2005 to
twenty to one in 2009.39 By this same measure, the white-to-Hispanic
median wealth ratio increased from seven to one in 2005 to eighteen
to one in 2009.40
The black-white and Hispanic-white racial and ethnic wealth gaps
have been increasing in large part as a result of the different exper-
iences these different racial and ethnic groups have had with respect
to homeownership over the course of the past several years. Over the
course of the past several years, the black homeownership rate has
declined sharply (and likely will continue to decline in the next few
years). By 2011, the gap in the black-white homeownership rate in-
creased by 2.3% over what it was in 2001 when the white homeowner-
36. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 106.
37. Id. at 86.
38. See Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative, INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV.,
http://www.insightcced.org/communities/Closing-RWG.htmi (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).




ship rate was 26.6% higher than the black homeownership rate.4 1 The
Hispanic homeownership rate has also declined steadily since 2005
when it reached 49.5% (a record high), and the current Hispanic-
white gap in homeownership rates stands at 26.9%, which is virtually
unchanged from 2001.42 Though steeply declining values for owner-
occupied homes account for the greatest erosion in household wealth
for all racial and ethnic groups over the course of the past several
years, Hispanics have experienced the greatest loss in home equity.
From 2005 to 2009, Hispanic homeowners lost 51% of their home eq-
uity, as measured by the median value of home equity for Hispanic
homeowners during this period.4 3 In contrast, African Americans lost
23% of their home equity, and white Americans lost 18% as measured
by the median value of home equity for these groups during this
period.44
More broadly, wealth gaps between the median white household
and the median African American and Hispanic households increased
dramatically between 2005 and 2009, despite the fact that the median
white household lost nearly $22,000 in net worth during this period,
which represented a 16% drop in white household wealth.45  The
wealth gaps increased because African American and Hispanic house-
holds experienced a far greater percentage reduction in their net
worth. African American households lost more than $6,400 in net
worth between 2005 and 2009, and this loss represented a 53% decline
in net worth for these households during this period.4 6 Hispanic
households lost more than $12,000 in net worth between 2005 and
2009, and this loss represented a 66% decline in net worth for these
households during this period.47
41. In terms of homeownership, the black homeownership rate was 44.9% in 2011, which
represented nearly a three percentage point drop from the 47.7% black homeownership rate in
2001. Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of Householder: 1994 to 2011, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/annuall1/annl1t_22.xls tbl.22 (last modified Sept.
21, 2012, 4:00 PM). The black homeownership rate has been declining steadily from the 2004,
49.1% black homeownership rate, which represented the high-water mark for black homeowner-
ship in this country's history. See id. In addition, the last time the black homeownership rate
was below 45% was in 1997 when it was 44.8%. See id. By contrast, the white homeownership
rate was 73.8% in 2011 and in 2001 it was 74.3%. Id. In addition, the white homeownership rate
in 2011 was 23.4% higher than the 46.9% Hispanic homeownership rate. See id.
42. See id.
43. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 27, at 2.
44. See id. at 4.
45. Id. at 14-15.




A significant reason black and Hispanic households lost substan-
tially more wealth in percentage terms between 2005 and 2009 is due
to the fact that both black and Hispanic families derived much more
of their net worth from home equity in 2005 than did white families.
In 2005, black households derived 59% of their net worth from home
equity, and Hispanic households drew 65% of their net worth from
home equity.48 In contrast, though home equity was the largest asset
by far for white households, it accounted for 44% of net worth for
white households. In short, in analyzing comparative data on mean
net worth for households, black and Hispanic households had asset
portfolios that had a much higher percentage of home equity from
ownership of a primary residence and were much less diversified in
terms of financial assets such as stocks, mutual funds, IRAs, and Ke-
ogh accounts.4 9 As a result, the sharp decline in real estate values in
this country from 2005 to 2009 had an especially large and negative
impact on the net worth of black and Hispanic households. The fact
that many other types of assets fared much better than real estate did
during this period did not cushion the loss black and Hispanic house-
holds experienced in their real estate holdings as much as it did for
white households given that white households had much more diversi-
fied asset portfolios than either black or Hispanic households.
In analyzing the data that the government first began collecting
on household wealth in the early 1980s, it becomes apparent that,
through 2009, white households and African American and Hispanic
households have had very different experiences in terms of being able
to build and maintain wealth, despite the fact each group lost wealth
between 2005 and 2009. Although, as discussed above, white house-
holds experienced a significant decline in their wealth between 2005
and 2009, white household wealth in 2009 was substantially higher
than it was for many if not most years between 1984 and 2009.50 In
contrast, black and Hispanic households possessed less wealth in 2009
than in any year since the Census Bureau began publishing data on
household wealth in 1984.51 Further, not only were the 2009 ratios of
white household wealth to black and Hispanic household wealth re-
spectively higher than they ever had been based upon the data the
Census Bureau began collecting on household wealth in the early
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id. at 25.




1980s, but they were also about double the ratios for the pre-2009
years the Pew Research Center used in its 1984-2009 time series
analysis.s2
II. AS INEQUALITY HAS RISEN, ECONOMIC
MOBILITY HAS DECLINED
A. Trends in Economic Mobility in the United States
Academics-mostly in the fields of sociology and economics-
have long studied intergenerational mobility. Sociologists have
tended to focus upon mobility in terms of status as measured by com-
paring the occupations (or some other similar indicator of status) of
parents with the occupations of their children." Economists, on the
other hand, have primarily measured mobility in terms of income by
using a statistic known as intergenerational elasticity in earnings,
"which is the percentage difference in earnings in the child's genera-
tion associated with the percentage difference in the parental genera-
tion."5 4 In terms of this statistic, there is more economic mobility in
countries with lower measures of intergenerational elasticity. Never-
theless, the academic literature on the relationship between economic
inequality and intergenerational mobility is somewhat underdevel-
oped, although there appears to be growing academic interest in stud-
ying this relationship.55
Despite high levels of income inequality in this country, Ameri-
cans do not support the redistribution of market income by the gov-
ernment to the degree that citizens in other Western democracies
support such governmental redistribution.56 In fact, in a twenty-
seven-country study on social attitudes, only 33% of Americans
agreed with the view that the government has a responsibility to help
reduce income inequalities, which resulted in the United States being
the country in the study with the lowest percentage of its citizens hold-
52. See id.
53. Miles Corak, Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in Compari-
son, in THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY, POVERTY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
109 (Robert S. Rycroft ed., forthcoming Mar. 2013).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Dan Andrews & Andrew Leigh, More Inequality, Less Social Mobility, 16 AP-
PLIED ECONS. LETTERS 1489, 1489 (2008), http://econpapers.repec.org/article/tafapecdt/defaultl6.
htm.
56. Isabel Sawhill & Sara McLanahan, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., at 3 (2006).
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ing this view." Such aversion to more robust redistribution can be
explained in part by a long-held conviction among most Americans
that nearly everyone in this country has the opportunity to achieve
upward economic mobility based upon their intelligence and skills ir-
respective of the economic circumstances into which they are born.
Of course, throughout American history there have been many exam-
ples of people such as Benjamin Franklin, Henry Ford, and Oprah
Winfrey, to name just a few, who have achieved remarkable upward
mobility despite starting life in relatively humble or even impover-
ished circumstances. 5 9 Moreover, there is strong evidence that eco-
nomic mobility in the United States in the nineteenth century and in
the early part of the twentieth century was exceptional as compared to
many other countries.6 0
In the years before the onset of the Great Recession, there was
little popular discussion about whether people in the United States
were as economically mobile as they had been in the decades after
World War II or whether people in the United States in fact have
greater opportunities for upward mobility than people in other com-
parable countries.6 1 Further, despite growing economic inequality in
the United States, many Americans believe that the overall economic
system in the United States is fair because they believe that economic
mobility in the United States is especially high as compared to other
countries. 6 2 Nevertheless, there is fairly strong evidence that some-
57. Julia B. Isaacs, International Comparisons of Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD
OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 37-38 (Julie Clover & lanna Kachoris
eds., 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/researchlfiles/reports/2008/2/econo
mic%20mobility%20sawhill/02_economic_mobility-sawhill.pdf. The percentage of Americans
who held this view was significantly lower than the percentage of respondents who held this view
in any other country in the study as between 46% and 89% of respondents in all of the other
countries held this view. Id. at 38.
58. See Sawhill & McLanahan, supra note 56. In a twenty-seven-country study of social
attitudes, the United States had the highest percentage of respondents (69%) who agreed with
the statement that "people are rewarded for intelligence and skill" and one of the lowest per-
centage of its people (19%) who consider it essential or very important to be born into a wealthy
family in order to get ahead economically. Isaacs, supra note 57, at 37.
59. See Trina Jones, Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an Increasingly Complex
Tapestry: Article: Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunity, 72 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 57, 58 n.7 (2009); Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Economy's Lower
Rungs, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2012, at Al; Sawhill & McLanahan, supra note 56 at 3.
60. Joseph P. Ferrie, HISTORY LESSONS: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM? MO-
BILITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 199, 214 (2005).
61. But cf DeParle, supra note 59 (showing how the discussion of American economic mo-
bility has recently moved towards center stage).
62. See Isabel Sawhill, Trends in Intergenerational Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING




time between 1980 and 1990, intergenerational mobility in the United
States declined sharply from the rates of intergenerational mobility
that had prevailed in this country from 1950 to 1980.63
It also appears that the decline in intergenerational economic mo-
bility is not evenly distributed. Although many Americans continue
to experience significant upward and downward mobility, economic
opportunity for many others is very sticky, which means it may de-
pend to a significant degree upon the economic status of the family
into which one is born. Very well-off families and poor families have
transferred their respective privileged and impoverished economic
statuses to their children over the course of the past few decades at a
much higher rate than is the case for middle-income families in which
there has not been a strong link between parents' income and the
earnings of their children.6 4 To this end, a 2008 study concluded that
42% of children born into families in the bottom fifth of the income
distribution remained in the bottom fifth as adults, and that 39% of
children born into the top fifth of the income distribution remained in
the top fifth as adults."
Although traditional measures of economic mobility are back-
wards-looking, which means they cannot be used to predict the eco-
nomic mobility for today's generation of children,6 6 there is great
cause for concern for the prospects of economic mobility for today's
generation of children in the United States. To this end, some re-
searchers have demonstrated that there is significantly less intergener-
ational economic mobility in countries that have comparatively
greater economic inequality than countries that have less economic
ity%20sawhill/02_economic mobility-sawhill.pdf; DeParle, supra note 59. In fact, there are
some economists who argue that countries throughout the world depend economically upon so-
called cutthroat capitalist countries such as the United States that tolerate great economic ine-
quality. They argue that the form of capitalism found in the United States provides the proper
incentives for innovation and technological breakthroughs, and that in turn, such innovation and
technological breakthroughs fuel global economic growth that in turns benefits other countries
including countries that have a more so-called cuddly form of capitalism. DARON ACEMOGLU ET
AL., CAN'T WE ALL BE MORE LIKE SCANDINAVIANS? ASYMMETRIC GROWTH AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 1-4 (2012), available at http://economics.mit.edulfaculty/
acemoglu/paper.
63. Bhashkar Mazumder, Is Intergenerational Economic Mobility Lower Now Than in the
Past?, CHI. FED LETTER (2012).
64. Corak, supra note 53, at 116; DeParle, supra note 59.
65. ISABEL SAWHILL, OVERVIEW, IN GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC
MoBILirY IN AMERICA 4 (Julie Clover & lanna Kachoris eds., 2008), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic%20mobility%20sawhill/02_econo
micmobility-sawhill.pdf.
66. Mazumder, supra note 63.
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inequality.6 7 One reason that there may be less economic mobility in
countries with high income and wealth inequalities is that parents who
are better off economically are often able to make investments of
money and time to improve their children's development of forms of
human capital that the market values than are parents who are less
well-off.
An exceptionally important form of human capital is education.
Despite the great potential that education can have in terms of pro-
moting social and economic mobility, in the United States, "the aver-
age effect of education at all levels is to reinforce rather than
compensate for the differences associated with family background and
the many home-based advantages and disadvantages that children and
adolescents bring with them into the classroom."" The public K-12
school systems in the United States provide at best "only a modest
boost to poor and minority children's chances of moving up the eco-
nomic ladder."6 9
In addition, the way the labor market in a given country rewards
people based upon their educational attainment can have a significant
impact upon economic mobility. Therefore, to the extent that labor
market returns increase in a particular country for those with more or
better education than for others with less or inferior education, par-
ents will have an incentive to invest more in their children's educa-
tion.70 If there is significant economic inequality in a given country,
the parents with both the incentive and the wherewithal to make
greater investments in their children's education inevitably will be the
wealthier parents.' Further, if the wealthier parents do increase their
investments as one rationally would expect, economic mobility is
likely to decline in that country unless public policies with respect to
education sufficiently counteract market forces by providing a net
benefit to the economically disadvantaged as opposed to those who
are not so disadvantaged.72
In the United States, wealthier parents have in fact been increas-
ing their investments of time and money into their children's educa-
67. Corak, supra note 53, at 114-15; Andrews & Leigh, supra note 55, at 8-10.
68. Sawhill, supra note 65, at 6.
69. Id. at 98.
70. Gary Solon, A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation Over Time and Place, in
GENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILrY IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE 37, 41 (Miles Corak ed.,
2004).




tion over the course of the past number of decades." As of yet, public
policies in the area of education have not benefited disadvantaged
families in any substantial way to counteract the increased invest-
ments that wealthier parents have made in their children's education.
In fact, there has been a reduction in the commitment to provide re-
sources to poor and minority students in public kindergarten through
12th grade school systems over the course of the past three decades or
so.7 4 Further, over the course of the past several years, the share of
financial aid benefitting low-income undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents has been falling "as needs-based assistance has been increas-
ingly replaced by merit-based aid."
Not only has the education system in the United States done little
to improve economic mobility in the country over the course of the
past few decades, it appears that the education system may well be
contributing to growing income and wealth inequalities. Without sig-
nificant reforms, this pattern may persist for generations. A few ex-
amples make this point. At a time in this country's history in which a
person's ability to attain economic security depends more and more
upon the extent to which one has high levels of educational achieve-
ment, a wide achievement gap has opened between the rich and the
poor. To this end, the gap in test scores sorted by family income has
73. Robert Haveman & Timothy Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobil-
ity, OPPORTUNITY IN AM.,125, 128 (2006); see also Jason DeParle, Leap to College Often Ends in
a Hard Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at Al.
Certainly as the payoff to education has grown ... affluent families have invested more
in it. They have tripled the amount by which they outspend low-income families on
enrichment activities like sports, music lessons and summer camps . . . [and] upper-
income parents, especially fathers, have increased their child-rearing time, while the
presence of fathers in low-income homes has declined.
DeParle, supra note 73, at Al.
74. See THE EDUCATION TRUST, The Funding Gap 2005: Low-Income and Minority Stu-
dents Shortchanged by Most States 2 (2005) ("Across the country, $907 less is spent per student
in the highest-poverty districts than in the most affluent districts. . . . Across the country, $614
less is spent on students in the districts educating the most students of color as compared to the
districts educating the fewest students of color."); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Ade-
quate" Isn't: The Retreat From Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56
EMORY L.J. 545, 571 (2006); New Data from U.S. Department of Education Highlights Educa-
tional Inequities Around Teacher Experience, Discipline and High School Rigor, U.S. DEPT.
EDUc. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-data-us-department-educa
tion-highlights-educational-inequities-around-teache. The data on the funding gaps between
rich and poor students actually understate the amount by which poor students are being short-
changed relative to wealthier students given that those who work on education policy commonly
employ a forty percent adjustment in calculating the financial resources students who grow up in
poverty need to achieve the same outcomes as wealthier students. THE EDUCATION TRUST,
supra at 74.
75. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 137.
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grown by thirty to forty percent for children who were born in 2001, as
compared to children who were born in 1976.76
There are also huge gaps in educational attainment by socioeco-
nomic status that make achieving greater economic mobility in this
country much more unlikely. Based upon one measure of family in-
come to family needs, 71% of youth from families in the top quartile
of the "family permanent income-to-needs" distribution attended col-
lege as compared to just 22% of youth from families in the bottom
quartile. Further, there was a 35 point gap in college graduation
rates between families in the top and bottom quartiles of the distribu-
tion with only 6-9% of youth from families at the bottom of the distri-
bution managing to graduate from college.78 Additionally, one study
divided all four-year colleges and universities in the United States into
four tiers. The study revealed that 74% of students in the entering
classes for the 146 colleges and universities in the top tier were from
families in the highest socioeconomic quartile and that just 3% of stu-
dents in the entering classes for these colleges and universities were
from the lowest quartile.79
B. Assessing Claims of American Exceptionalism in Terms
of Mobility
Over the course of the past two decades, a significant number of
academic studies have undermined the conventional wisdom that peo-
ple in the United States enjoy a particularly high degree of economic
mobility as compared to people in many countries that are otherwise
significantly comparable to the United States.o These studies come
to similar conclusions, regardless of whether they measure intergener-
ational mobility in terms of income or in terms of occupation.
Though studies appear to demonstrate that Americans enjoy a reason-
76. Sean Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the
Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUAL-
ITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 91, 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murname
eds., 2011).
77. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 131.
78. Id.; see also DeParle, supra note 73 (noting that while a greater percentage of rich and
poor Americans alike have completed college over the course of the past thirty years, there is
now a forty-five point gap between the percentage of wealthy Americans who earn a bachelor's
degree and poor Americans who earn a bachelor's degree and that the gap thirty years ago was
thirty-one percent).
79. Haveman & Smeeding, supra note 73, at 130.
80. DeParle, supra note 59.
81. Emily Beller & Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in
Comparative Perspective, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., 19, (2006).
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ably high degree of occupational mobility, the United States is just
average in terms of occupational mobility when compared to other
industrialized countries.
In addition, among many rich countries, the United States ranks
below average in terms of income mobility." In fact, in a study that
measured intergenerational elasticity of earnings in twenty-two coun-
tries, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States each had in-
tergenerational elasticity estimates of approximately 0.5, which
resulted in these countries being ranked as the least economically mo-
bile countries of the wealthy countries in the study.84 Not only did the
United States rank significantly below countries such as Germany, Ja-
pan, and Australia in terms of mobility, but the United States also had
an elasticity measure that was two to three times as large as the
wealthy countries with the greatest degree of mobility.85 To this end,
the estimate of intergenerational mobility in the United States was
approximately two-and-a-half times larger than the estimate for in-
tergenerational mobility in Canada. Given how similar the two coun-
tries are otherwise in many respects, the difference in economic
mobility between the countries suggests that Canada and the United
States have among other differences some key public policies that are
very different and that the labor market in Canada operates some-
what differently from the labor market in the United States.8 6 These
apparent differences in public policy and in how the labor market op-
erates in the two countries appear to make Canadians significantly
more economically mobile than Americans.
C. Intergenerational Income Mobility for African Americans
Without question, there has been significant intergenerational ec-
onomic mobility within the African American community over the
course of the past several decades. In 1940, 90% of African American
men and women lived in poverty; full-time working black men earned
just 43% of what comparable white men earned on average; and just
2% of African Americans who were aged twenty-five to twenty-nine
82. Id. at 30. Occupational mobility is higher in Canada, Sweden, and Norway than it is in
the United States. Id. In contrast, occupational mobility is lower in West Germany, Ireland, and
Portugal than it is in the United States. Id.
83. Id.
84. Corak, supra note 53, at 111,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 120.
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were college graduates.87 By 2000, the poverty rate for African Amer-
icans was 30%; full-time working black men earned 73% of what com-
parable white men earned on average; and 15% of African Americans
who were aged twenty-five to twenty-nine were college graduates."
Despite the fact that economic conditions have improved dramat-
ically for African Americans over the course of the past several de-
cades, African Americans remain much less upwardly mobile and
much more downwardly mobile than white Americans when one con-
siders the overall distribution of income. In terms of cycles of poverty,
42% of black children born in the bottom tenth of the income distri-
bution remain in the bottom decile of income as adults, as compared
to 17% of comparable white children.89 African Americans also have
been unable to move up from the bottom rungs of the income distri-
bution to the top nearly as frequently as white Americans. Fewer
than 4% of African American children born into families in the lowest
quartile of the income distribution have ended up in the top quartile
as adults, as compared to 14% of comparable white children. 90 Con-
versely, black children born in the top quartile of the income distribu-
tion have just a 15% chance of remaining there as adults while
comparable white children have a 45% chance of remaining in the top
quartile in their adult years.9'
III. WHY ISN'T THERE A MORE SUBSTANTIAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENT FOR GREATER ECONOMIC EQUALITY?
At first blush, one might think that the socioeconomic conditions
that millions of Americans have endured over the course of the past
few years would create the conditions for a broad-based social move-
ment and that those in such a movement would relentlessly press both
decision-makers in both the public and private sectors to take actions
that would promote greater equality.92 With the growing concentra-
tions of income and wealth, many more people in this country should
be similarly situated economically, given that the middle class has
87. Melissa S. Kearney, Intergenerational Mobility for Women and Minorities in the United
States, OPPORTUNITY IN AM., 37, 38 (2006).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 48.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 49.
92. See Bekad Mandell, Putting Theory into Practice: Using a Human Rights Framework
and Grassroots Organizing to Build a National Revolutionary Movement, 1 COLUM. J. RACE &
L. 402, 408 (2012).
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struggled considerably as the affluent have become much more afflu-
ent, which in turn has resulted in greater polarization among those in
different economic classes.93 Nevertheless, consistent with what oc-
curred during some other periods of economic crisis in this country's
history, the overwhelming majority of Americans-including the
overwhelming majority of the disadvantaged or those who have re-
cently experienced significant downward mobility-have not taken to
the streets or otherwise participated in any social movement.9 4
Why do Americans appear to have little appetite for building any
mass social movement to address inequality or for challenging in some
other ways those who may be in positions to alleviate the economic
suffering millions are enduring? Obviously, the reasons are complex.
However, this phenomenon can be explained in part by how Ameri-
cans misperceive their individual economic circumstances and how
they improperly estimate the overall distribution of income and
wealth in this country, by longstanding internal divisions within those
otherwise similarly situated in terms of class status, and by the manner
in which some with substantial economic and political power have
been able to foster conflict among middle and working class people.
A. Americans' Perceptions and Misperceptions about Economic
Inequality and the Economy
Americans' perception of their own economic status, as well as
the overall distribution of wealth in this country, undercuts the effort
to challenge the United States' actual (and very high) degree of eco-
nomic inequality. In terms of wealth distribution, professors from
Harvard Business School and Duke University's Department of Psy-
chology have demonstrated that Americans severely underestimate
the degree of wealth inequality in this country.95 The nationally rep-
resentative group of more than 5,500 Americans who responded to
the survey that Norton and Ariely developed estimated that the
wealthiest 20% of Americans held approximately 59% of the wealth,
though the actual percentage these Americans held at the time of the
survey was approximately 84%.96 Further, in response to the question
asking these respondents for their ideal distribution of wealth, the re-
93. Id. at 408-09.
94. Id. at 409.
95. Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America - One Wealth Quintile at a
Time, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCi. 9, 9 (2011).
96. Id. at 10.
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spondents indicated that they preferred the top 20% to hold 32% of
wealth and for those in the bottom three quintiles to receive a sub-
stantially larger share of the overall wealth than they (incorrectly) be-
lieved these groups held at the time of the survey.9 7
Though there were small differences between some of the differ-
ent demographic groups of respondents in terms of perceptions of the
actual distribution of wealth and construction of an ideal distribution
of wealth, there was much more consensus. No group, whether com-
prised of those by income status, party affiliation, or gender, believed
that the wealthiest 20% of Americans held more than approximately
60% of the wealth in this country. 98 Perhaps unexpectedly, there was
general consensus among the different groups of respondents that the
wealthiest 20% of Americans should hold somewhere between ap-
proximately 30% and 40% of the country's wealth and that the bot-
tom four quintiles in the wealth distribution should hold a
substantially higher percentage of the country's wealth than is pres-
ently the case.
Many Americans also appear to have a significant misperception
about their place in the income distribution. A recent Gallup poll in-
dicates that 55% of Americans consider themselves to be middle class
or upper-middle class and that this percentage has remained stable
over the course of the past several years, though it was slightly higher
before the onset of the Great Recession.9 9 In addition, 31% of Amer-
icans identify themselves as working class, a percentage that has re-
mained almost unchanged over the course of the past eleven years.100
Though Gallup reports that the percentage of Americans who per-
ceive themselves as lower class has grown over the course of the past
decade from 3% to 10%, there is some evidence that low-income
Americans overestimate their standing in the income distribution'01
and that wealthy Americans underestimate their position in the in-
come distribution.10 2
97. Id.
98. Id. at 11.
99. Andrew Dugan, Americans Most Likely to Say They Belong to the Middle Class, GAL-
LUP (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/polIl159029/americans-likely-say-belong-middle-
class.aspx.
100. Id.





The misperceptions Americans have about their relative eco-
nomic standing likely negatively impact support for redistributive pol-
icies. This may be the case because many lower-income people who
overestimate their earnings incorrectly believe they would benefit by
supporting regressive tax and other governmental policies favoring
wealthier Americans, and many wealthy Americans believe their taxes
are far too high based upon an incorrect belief that they are not in fact
upper income (and despite the fact that many of these wealthy Ameri-
cans believe that the wealthy as a group pay too little in taxes).103
Even to the extent that low-income Americans properly estimate their
position in the income distribution, studies indicate that many such
Americans are overly optimistic about the opportunity for upward so-
cial and economic mobility in this country, which may explain why
many of these people do not support greater redistributive policies.104
Whether or not black and Hispanic Americans severely mis-
perceive their current economic circumstances or are overly optimistic
about their future economic opportunities, they feel more optimistic
about the national economy at this time and their economic prospects
for the future than whites. This is the case despite the fact that the
Great Recession had a particularly devastating impact upon African
Americans and Hispanics, and despite the fact that they otherwise
have been unable over the past few decades to close in any substantial
way some of the more longstanding economic gaps that have sepa-
rated them from whites.os Despite these facts, a substantially higher
percentage of blacks and Hispanics believes that their economic con-
dition will be better in the next several years than is the case for white
Americans, and three times as many blacks and Hispanics aged eigh-
teen to thirty-four as compared to similarly situated whites believe
they will be better off economically than their parents during the
course of their lives as adults.10 6 Substantially higher percentages of
middle-class African Americans and Hispanics than white Americans
indicate that they are now financially better off than they were before
103. See id.; Catherine Rampell, Rich People Still Don't Realize They're Rich, N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 19, 2011, 1:41 PM, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/rich-people-still-dont-re
alize-theyre-rich/.
104. Norton & Ariely, supra note 95, at 12.
105. See Luke Reidenbach & Christian Weller, The State of Minorities in 2010: Minorities Are
Suffering Disproportionately in the Recession, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESs 1 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/state-of_minorities.pdf.
106. See Yolanda Young, Blacks, Hispanics Find Reasons for Optimism, USA TODAY, Dec.




the onset of the Great Recession'0 7 although substantially more mid-
dle-class African Americans and Hispanics than middle-class whites
report that they endured two or more negative economic experiences
in the past year or so. 0 '
In terms of political activism, it seems clear that blacks and His-
panics have not been engaged in mass protests in the past several
years in any substantial way, and they show no signs of preparing to
engage in any mass protests in which they would demand greater eco-
nomic opportunities or greater economic equality in terms of class and
race.10 Given the fact that blacks and Hispanics first passed whites in
expressing greater levels of satisfaction with the national economy in
2008 and 2009 around the time of President Barack Obama's historic
election and during the early months of his presidency," 0 it will be
interesting to track whether this racial trend in reported satisfaction
with the national economy will continue after President Obama's sec-
ond term ends, especially if our country's next President is not a per-
son of color who receives widespread support from racial and ethnic
minorities.
B. The Role Low-Income People and the Working Class Play in
Creating Self-Reinforcing Inequality
Throughout the history of the United States, it has often been a
challenge for those in similar social or economic classes to work to-
gether in a collective way in an effort to achieve greater economic
equality for all. Oftentimes, certain groups of working or middle-class
people have taken actions which have disadvantaged others in the
working class or middle-class. Though one might think that during
periods of economic crisis and growing economic inequality, working
and middle-class people would be more inclined to work in solidarity
with one another to improve their collective economic circumstances,
oftentimes just the opposite has happened. Instead of working to-
gether in solidarity during these times, many in the working and mid-
107. PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 3, at 3 (reporting that just 28 percent of middle-class
whites claim they are better off now than they were before the recession while 49 percent of
middle-class blacks and 43 percent of middle-class Hispanics report that they are better off).
108. Id. at 3.




die-class have competed against each other based upon the notion
that economic opportunities overall represent a zero sum game."'
There have been many reasons that Americans who are consid-
ered working or middle-class, in terms of their income or wealth, have
not worked together in greater numbers to achieve greater economic
equality in this country or have not supported public policies that
would provide particular benefits to those in the working or middle-
class. I will highlight three of these reasons. First, many people who
are working class or middle-class by economic status form a greater
sense of themselves along identity axes of race, gender, religion, geog-
raphy, sexual orientation, or culture, for example, as opposed to along
economic lines." 2 Second, the working class is segmented in impor-
tant ways, which often creates economic incentives for different
groups of people in the working class to be in conflict with other
groups of working-class people."' Third, and consistent with the sec-
ond reason just noted, racial and ethnic conflict often has resulted in
many working-class people of one race or ethnic group failing to sup-
port or even actively working against working-class people of another
race or ethnicity for economic and non-economic reasons.114 Not only
have there been conflicts or divisions between whites and minorities
in the working class, but there often have also been inter-minority
conflicts among working-class people."'
Many political scientists, economists, and others worry that eco-
nomic inequality may become self-reinforcing because the more afflu-
ent may be able to use their wealth to gain more political influence
that they use in turn to enhance their wealth, while those who are
poorer lose political influence and as a result the ability to secure for
themselves vital governmental resources that are often needed for up-
111. Sherry Linkon, The Changing Working Class, in WORKING-CLASS PERSPECTIVES: COM-
MENTARY ON WORKING-CLASS CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND POLrTIcS (Nov. 19, 2012), http://
workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/category/issues/understanding-class/ ("[Claiming that con-
temporary] workplaces no longer provide as many opportunities for workers to come together or
recognize their shared interests, and in a tight economy, working-class people sometimes see
each other as the competition.").
112. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1783
(2011).
113. See Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice
Achievable in the United States, 8 CONN. PuB. INT. L.J. 207, 216 (2009).
114. See id. at 245, 249.
115. See id. at 249 n.171.
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ward mobility." 6 Nevertheless, two political scientists have recently
concluded that during periods in which economic inequality increases,
the rich and the poor alike both become more conservative and ex-
press decreased support for government policies that would reduce
economic inequality."' Though this conclusion may seem counterin-
tuitive to many, a recent Pew Research Center report that in part
evaluated the percentage of Americans who support a government so-
cial safety net offers some support. According to the report, in 1987,
71% of Americans supported the view that the government is respon-
sible for taking care of people who cannot take care of themselves;
however, in 2012, just 59% of Americans agreed with this view."18
While public support for a government safety net has decreased over
the course of the past twenty-five years or so, inequality has
increased." 9
C. Examples of Internal Divisions Among Working-Class People
The following paragraphs will present two examples of how divi-
sions among working-class and middle-class Americans have made it
more difficult to address economic inequality. The first example, and
a very contemporary example, describes the political battles and mass
protests in Wisconsin that began in February 2011 after Governor
Scott Walker announced his intention to eliminate, for all intents and
purposes, collective bargaining for most public employees who were
members of public sector unions. This example highlights the manner
in which many working-class and middle-class Americans are bitterly
divided along political lines with respect to important economic issues
and the fact that there are limits to the efficacy of mass protests given
the level of partisan division among the electorate.
116. See JACOB S. HACKER ET AL., INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY, in INEQUALITY AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED To LEARN 156, 197-200
(Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005); see also Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 39-52.
117. Nathan T. Kelly & Peter K. Enns., Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The
Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI.
855, 867-69 (2010).
118. See Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years: Trends in American Values:
1987-2012, PEw RESEARCH CTR. 55 (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdfl06-04-12%2OValues%20Release.pdf.
119. It should be noted, however, that the Pew Research Center's study does indicate that
there was some downward and upward fluctuation in levels of support of a government safety
net between 1987 and 2012. Even so, the overall trend has been downward over this period of
time and public support for a government safety net fell steadily from the onset of the Great
Recession through 2012. Id.
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The second example is an example from the New Deal. Though
the New Deal era is widely considered a very progressive period in
American history, New Deal policy and the general public's response
to government efforts to address the dire economic circumstances mil-
lions of Americans experienced during this period were highly racial-
ized. Though the New Deal example is obviously from a prior period
in this country's history, some of the dynamics that contributed to
government officials in the New Deal providing many minorities with
much less support than they needed based upon their economic cir-
cumstances have also informed the way that government officials to-
day have responded to the economic conditions many minorities face.
1. Protests and Labor Strife in Wisconsin: A Cautionary Tale on
the Limits of Large-Scale Protests to Affect Political
Change in a Time of Polarization
Without question, there is an incredibly high level of polarization
and divisiveness in the body politic in the United States today.120 Al-
though significant gaps in values persist between different demo-
graphic groups of Americans sorted in terms of their race and
ethnicity, educational attainment, economic class, religiosity, and gen-
der, these divisions have neither increased nor decreased appreciably
over the course of the past quarter century.12 1 In contrast, the gap in
values between those who identify as Democrats or as Republicans
has almost doubled in the past twenty-five years, and this partisan gap
now represents the largest gap among all other demographic divi-
sions.122 Not only has the partisan gap overtaken the racial and edu-
cational gaps, it is now fifty percent larger than the racial values gap,
which represents the second largest values gap.123
In terms of political polarization, many now believe that the state
of Wisconsin, a state previously long known for civility in its polit-
ics, 124 is the most politically divisive state in America.125 In 2011, polls





124. Dan Kaufman, Land of Cheese and Rancor, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2012, http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E6DA1E3CF934A15756COA9649D8B63&pagewanted
=1
125. Dan Kaufman, How Did Wisconsin Become the Most Politically Divisive Place in




showed that the gap between Democrats and Republicans in terms of
whether they approved or disapproved of Governor Scott Walker
made Governor Walker one of the most, if not the most, polarizing
governors in the United States, given that the so-called partisan gap in
approval ratings for Governor Walker was 78%.126 Governor
Walker's announcement of his decision to seek to end collective bar-
gaining rights for most public employees who were members of public
sector unions12 7-rights which Wisconsin public employees gained in
1959, making them the first public employees in any state to be
granted collective bargaining rights128-sparked massive protests in
February and early March of 2011.129 During this period, tens of
thousands of people participated in protests against Governor Walker
and the Republicans who controlled the state legislature, with 100,000
or more people joining one of the protests on February 26, 2011.130
Many believe that the massive protests in Wisconsin provided some
significant inspiration for the Occupy Wall Street movement. 1 3 1
After the Republican-controlled legislature passed the bill strip-
ping most public employees of their collective bargaining rights, Gov-
ernor Walker signed the bill into law on March 11, 2011.132 Those
who opposed Governor Walker next turned their attention to seeking
to recall certain Republican lawmakers, including Governor
also Bob Secter, Bruised-Purple Wisconsin Takes Political Beating State's Near-Even Red-Blue
Split Fuels Barrage of Attack Ads in Tight Races for Senate, President, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov. 2,
2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-02/news/ct-nw-wisconsin-wrap-20121102-1wis
consin-dells-republican-party-chairman-scott-walker.
126. See Craig Gilbert, Scott Walker Could Be the Most Polarizing Governor?, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL Mar. 8, 2011, at Al.
127. Michael A. Fletcher, Thousands Turn Out for Latest Protest Against Wis. Governor's
Budget Plan, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/05/AR2(011030503728.html; see also Barbara Rodriguez, Madison, Wis.: Protests Mark
Year Since Gov. Scott Walker's Collective Bargaining Law, TwINCITIES.COM (Mar. 10, 2012, 8:37
PM), http://www.twincities.com/wisconsin/ci_20148202/madison-wis-protests-mark-year-since-
collective-bargaining.
128. WLHS Primer on Wisconsin Labor History, Wis. LABOR HISTORY Soc'y, http://www.
wisconsinlaborhistory.org/?page-id=34 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
129. See Fletcher, supra note 127; Rodriguez, supra note 127.
130. See Abby Sewell, Protesters Out in Force Nationwide to Oppose Wisconsin's Anti-Union
Bill, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/26/nation/la-na-wisconsin-
protests-20110227.
131. Kira Zalan, The Wisconsin Protests' Widespread Influence - From Obama to Occupy
Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/arti
cles/2012/03/02/the-wisconsin-protests-widespread-influencefrom-obama-to-occupy-wall-street.
132. Stephanie Condon, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Anti-union Bill - But Demo-




Walker.' After those who opposed the governor filed more than
one million signatures of people seeking to recall and remove him
from office, many in Wisconsin and in the country assumed that Gov-
ernor Walker would have a very difficult time becoming the first gov-
ernor in United States history to survive a recall election.134
However, in spite of the massive protests and the huge number of
Wisconsinites who signed the recall petition, Governor Walker con-
vincingly won the recall election by more than seven points. 35 In an
election that featured the issue of collective bargaining for union
members, the exit polls provided evidence of the substantial polariza-
tion of the Wisconsin electorate, even among those in the working and
middle classes.'3 6 Fifty-six percent of middle-class voters, as well as
56% of those without a college degree, voted for Governor Walker.13 7
What may be particularly surprising to many is the fact that of the
one-third of the voters who either belonged to a union or who had
someone in their household who belonged to a union, 38% voted for
Governor Walker.13 8  Though it is likely that many of these voters
were in households that had people who were members of the police,
firefighters, and State patrol unions-public sector unions exempted
from the collective bargaining bill' 3 9-it is also apparent that many
other people from union households supported Governor Walker. 40
133. See Rachel Weiner, Wisconsin Recall Petition Gets Over 1 Million Signatures; Demo-




135. Clay Barbour et al., Re-Affirmed: After More Than a Year of Fierce Partisan Battles,
Gov. Scott Walker and His Fellow Republican Lawmakers Dominate the Polls on Tuesday, Wis.
STATE J., June 6, 2012, at Al.




139. See Steven Verburg, Special Collective Bargaining Status for Police and Fire Unions
Causing Problems, Wis. STATE J., Jan. 7, 2012, 6:50 AM, http://host.madison.com/news/locall
govt-and-politics/special-collective-bargaining-status-for-police-and-fire-unions-causinglarticle_c
8900f50-38c7-llel-a949-0019bb2963f4.html.
140. Sarah Dutton & Jennifer De Pinto, How Scott Walker Won the Wisconsin Recall Elec-




2. Government Officials and Politicians Have Felt Constrained to
Deal with Racial Disparities Including in Times of General
Economic Crisis
Just as they are today, African Americans were significantly over-
represented among the poor in the early 1930s. Further, for most Af-
rican Americans, the Great Depression simply worsened their
longstanding economic plight and oppression.14 ' If Congress and the
Roosevelt Administration had designed many New Deal programs in
a universal way to benefit Americans largely on the basis of demon-
strated need, and if they had implemented such programs in a nondis-
criminatory way, the New Deal would have dramatically improved the
socioeconomic status of African Americans, as well as the socioeco-
nomic status of other people of color. Nevertheless, the government
designed or administered many New Deal programs in a racially dis-
criminatory way in part to appease certain powerful economic inter-
ests and many white Americans.
Racial discrimination in these programs took many forms.1 4 2 In a
particularly damaging manifestation of racism, certain New Deal pro-
grams excluded an extremely large percentage of impoverished Afri-
can Americans. For example, three major New Deal legislative acts
explicitly excluded agricultural laborers and those who worked in the
domestic service sector. These acts included the Social Security Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 14 3 The exclusion of these occupational categories, which ac-
counted for two-thirds of black employment in the United States and
between seventy and eighty percent of black employment in many
parts of the South' 4 4 helped solidify racial divisions within the labor
market.14 5
While our country is still recovering from the worst economic cri-
sis Americans have experienced since the Great Depression, many
politicians and government officials still feel constrained to address
141. Robert C. Weaver, The New Deal and the Negro: A Look at the Facts, 13 OPPORTUNITY:
J. OF NEGRO LIFE 200, 200 (1935).
142. See Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimina-
tion in the New Deal, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1335, 1353-71 (1987). Over time, most of the discrimina-
tory provisions included in different pieces of New Deal legislation were stricken. Id. at 1336.
143. Juan F. Perea, Destined for Servitude, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 245, 250 (2009).
144. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE AcrION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 43 (2005). By amendment to the origi-
nal Social Security Act, domestic laborers were added in 1950 and agricultural laborers were
added in 1954. Id.
145. Mandell, supra note 92, at 407.
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the range of economic issues particularly facing minorities because
they often worry that focusing on these type of issues would generate
backlash from white Americans. To be clear, few people claim that
the federal programs that were designed to heal the economy in the
wake of the Great Recession and that were enacted into law after
President Barack Obama took office have been racialized to the detri-
ment of minorities in the way that many New Deal programs were
racialized. Nevertheless, there are many who believe that President
Barack Obama and others in his administration have shied away from
developing policies to specifically address severe racial issues in our
society out of a concern that addressing issues of racial injustice would
erode the support he has received from white Americans and would
prevent him from building upon this support.146 These purported con-
cerns are not unfounded, as President Obama has experienced politi-
cal setbacks when he has addressed certain racial issues in an open
way no matter how sensitively he has sought to address them.147 Nev-
ertheless, one commentator claims that severe racial economic gaps
together with other serious racial gaps "are becoming unremarkable
features of the post-racial world" in which critical and unresolved ra-
cial issues are not framed, for pragmatic political reasons, as arising
from racial discrimination or injustice.148
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION CAN DO MORE TO
PROMOTE GREATER ECONOMIC EQUALITY
A. A Multifaceted Strategy Is Needed to Reduce Economic
Inequality
The effort to reduce economic inequality and to increase in-
tergenerational economic mobility in this country must draw upon the
expertise of many different types of people and organizations from a
broad spectrum of backgrounds. In terms of such an overall strategy,
law will not play the largest role or perhaps even a central role in
efforts to promote more economic equality, including in the effort to
reduce the substantial racial economic gaps that now exist in our
146. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1336 (2011).
147. Paul Glastris, Introduction: Race, History, and Obarna's Second Term, WASH.
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2013, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january-
february_2013/features/introductionrace-history.and042044.php?page=1.
148. Crenshaw, supra note 146, at 1336-40.
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country.14 9 Nevertheless, there is an important role for lawyers and
legal institutions of one kind or another to play in the effort to in-
crease economic opportunities for millions of Americans, so that the
American dream can become more of a reality for a broader swath of
the American public.
To create greater income equality and economic mobility in the
United States, there is broad consensus among academics, policymak-
ers, and others that we, as a country, must dramatically improve the
educational system and educational opportunities for poor and low- to
moderate-income Americans.150 Many others believe that to reduce
income inequality, our tax system also needs to be changed to make it
much more progressive and more like tax systems in many other in-
dustrialized countries that do much more to redistribute pretax in-
come. 151  Others suggest that to reduce economic inequality in the
United States, we must reform our criminal justice system, given that
the United States incarcerates more people per capita than any other
country in the world.'5 2 Still others argue that major reforms are
needed with respect to our country's policies impacting family struc-
ture and the capacity of parents to make important financial and non-
financial investments in their children, among other relevant areas of
policy.' Although reforming policies in any of the aforementioned
policy areas would help promote greater equality in this country, for
inequality to be addressed in a substantial way, significant reforms
would need to be made in a number of different policy areas, whether
in areas implicating education, tax, the criminal justice system, health
care and nutrition, family life, housing, etc.
149. See, e.g., Calavita, supra note 4, at 499; Jones, supra note 59, at 87.
150. See, e.g., Ron Haskins, Education and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR Los-
ING GROUND: ECONOMIC MoBILITY IN AMERICA 101 (Julie Clover & lanna Kachoris eds., 2008),
available at http://www.brookings.edul-/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic%20mobili
ty%20sawhilIl02_economicmobility-sawhill.pdf; Dan Ariely, Americans Want to Live in a
Much More Equal Country (They Just Don't Realize It), ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:41 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.conilbusiness/archive/2012/08/americans-want-to-live-in-a-much-more-
equal-country-they-just-dont-realize-it/260639/; Beller & Hout, supra note 81, at 31; Haveman &
Smeeding, supra note 73, at 143; Jones, supra note 59, at 87; Sawhill, supra note 62, at 4-5.
151. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 273-74; Calavita, supra note 4, at 500; Ariely, supra
note 150.
152. See Eduardo Porter, At the Polls, Choose Your Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at
B1.
153. See, e.g., Beller & Hout, supra note 81, at 31; Corak, supra note 53, at 120. However,
there is not universal agreement on the extent to which changes in family structure in the United




In terms of promoting greater wealth equality, a number of orga-
nizations that are not primarily legal organizations have developed de-
tailed policy agendas setting forth policies that would enable low- to
moderate-income individuals and households to build wealth. One
such leading organization is the Corporation for Enterprise Develop-
ment (CFED). CFED's policy agenda addresses the following five is-
sue areas: financial assets and income, businesses and jobs, housing
and homeownership, education, and health. 154 Within these five issue
areas, a limited number of CFED's proposals do have an explicitly
legal component, such as proposals encouraging states to adopt more
robust laws designed to prevent foreclosure or to protect some of the
assets of those who have their property foreclosed.155
In terms of efforts to address racial economic gaps, those working
on behalf of the Insight Center for Community Economic Develop-
ment's Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative have developed policy
briefs and papers to address strategies to close racial wealth gaps.156
Just like CFED's policy proposals, some of the policy proposals that
are part of the package of proposals that those (including this author)
working on behalf of the Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Initiative have
developed have an explicit legal component.'57  Further, over the
course of the past four years, a few organizations have sponsored an
annual African American economic summit to address the many se-
vere economic challenges currently facing the black community.
Howard University hosted this year's fourth annual summit on Febru-
ary 1, 2013,158 and a number of the university's departments and cen-
ters, as well as the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies and
Duke University's Research Network on Racial and Ethnic Inequal-
ity, sponsored the summit.159 It is somewhat striking that no legal or-
154. See Policy Agenda, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., http://cfed.org/policy/policy-agendal
(last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
155. See Policy Brief Foreclosure Prevention and Protections, CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV.,
(2012), available at http://cfed.org/assets/scorecard/2013/pb Foreclosure Prevention_.2013.pdf.
156. See Publications and Materials, INSIGHT CENTER FOR COMTY. ECON. DEv., http://www.
insightcced.org/index.php?page=Policy (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
157. SeeThe Racial Gap in Land Retention, Acquisition, and Development, INSIGHT CTR. FOR
CTy. EcON. DEV., (2009), available at http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/ CRWG/Racial-Gap-
Land-Retention-6-09.pdf.
158. See Michael A. Fletcher, Financial Picture for Black Americans Bleak, Scholars Say,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 2, 2013, at A10; Fourth Annual Economic Summit, How. U. DEP'T. EcoN.,
http://www.coas.howard.edu/economics/news&eventslivestream.html (last visited March 1,
2013).
159. See Fourth Annual Economic Summit, supra note 158.
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ganization took part in the summit and that no practicing attorneys
participated as speakers.
B. Legal Organizations Should Develop Detailed Strategic Plans
Setting Forth Legal Strategies to Promote Greater
Economic Equality
Irrespective of whether it is in a leading or supporting way, there
is a very important role for lawyers and legal organizations to play in
the broader effort to promote greater economic equality in this coun-
try. Just as some primarily non-legal organizations have developed
detailed policy proposals designed to promote economic equality in
general or to address economic challenges that various communities
of color are experiencing, more legal organizations can also develop
such comprehensive policy agendas or legal strategies. In some in-
stances, legal organizations that would develop these types of agendas
or legal strategies could help complement the initiatives that many
non-legal organizations have pursued. In other instances, legal orga-
nizations that would develop such policy agendas or legal strategies to
promote greater economic equality could play a leading role in ad-
dressing certain relevant stand-alone legal issues, given that many if
not most non-legal organizations lack a comparative advantage to ad-
dress these types of legal issues in a sophisticated way.
Though there are many legal and non-legal organizations that
promote social justice or civil rights that have made promoting eco-
nomic justice a central part of their work,16 o there is still much room
for other legal institutions committed to social justice to promote
greater economic equality in a more robust way. To this end, there
are important roles for lawyers with expertise in many different sub-
stantive areas of the law to play, including those with expertise in busi-
ness and transactional areas of the law. In terms of developing this
generation's social engineers in the field of law, law schools with a
commitment to promoting social justice and civil rights should make
an intentional effort to make sure that their law students appreciate
the fact that many different types of lawyers can play a meaningful
160. See, e.g., Letter from Marc H. Morial, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Nat'l Urban
League, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader of the U.S.
House of Representatives & John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, avail-
able at http://nul.iamempowered.com/content/national-urban-league-calls-president-obama-con
gressional-leaders-make-economic-opportunity; Economic Equality, LAW. COMM. FOR Civ. RTs.
S. F. BAY AREA, http://www.Iccr.com/economic-equality.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
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role in helping to promote economic justice and equality. Finally,
given that the goal of reducing economic inequality in our society rep-
resents an enormous, long-term challenge, lawyers and legal organiza-
tions committed to addressing the issue should utilize every legal tool
and resource that they can deploy in the struggle to promote greater
equality, including some that public interest and civil rights lawyers
have underutilized in some significant ways to date.
C. Examples of How the Law Could Be More Effectively Utilized
to Promote Equality
Based upon the work I have done in the area of real property and
real estate law, I will offer two concrete examples of ways in which
lawyers and legal institutions could play a more significant role in pro-
moting economic equality. These examples serve as examples of what
can be done in other areas of law as well. Though these particular
examples address the role lawyers can play in addressing certain racial
economic issues, the examples also offer insight into the role lawyers
can play in addressing the overall issue of reducing economic inequal-
ity in this country.
1. Lawyers Should Play a More Active Role in Developing
Strategies to Increase Minority Homeownership'and to
Make Such Ownership More Secure
Given that equity in a primary residence represents the largest
asset most Americans of any race or ethnicity possess in their asset
portfolios, lawyers should undertake efforts to increase homeowner-
ship within the African American and Latino communities, particu-
larly given the current substantial racial homeownership gaps between
these groups and white Americans. As indicated earlier, 28.9% fewer
African Americans own their own homes as compared to white Amer-
icans, and this gap is larger than it was in any year between 1994 and
2009.161 This means that all the progress that had been made in nar-
rowing the black-white homeownership gap in the mid to late 1990s
and early 2000s has been reversed. Similarly, the progress made dur-
ing the late 1990s and early 2000s in narrowing the Hispanic-white
homeownership gap has been set back as the Hispanic-white home-




ownership gap has been growing in recent years and is now approxi-
mately as large as it was in 2001.
Nevertheless, those who advocate for a renewed push to increase
minority homeownership must learn important lessons from the drive
to increase minority homeownership during the 1990s and 2000s.
Many who began advocating for increased minority homeownership
approximately two decades ago had all the best intentions and did in
fact develop detailed strategies to accomplish their goal. 16 2 However,
the progress that was made in increasing minority homeownership in
the 1990s and early 2000s masked a number of troubling issues that in
the enj contributed to washing away all of the gains that African
Americans and Latinos made in increasing their homeownership
rates. Not only have many African Americans and Latinos lost their
homes, they have also lost tens of billions of dollars in home equity
over the course of the past several years.
In terms of lessons that should be learned, it has become clear,
for example, that a number of troubling aspects of the way in which
lenders made subprime loans resulted in homeownership resting on a
foundation of sand for far too many. For many, terms in many sub-
prime loans that did not allow for prepayment of the loan or that re-
quired balloon payments many times the size of the normal monthly
payment, for example, were factors that contributed to driving home-
owners into foreclosure.163 In other instances, there is evidence that
lenders steered minorities into taking out subprime loans, though they
may have qualified for prime loans that had much lower interest rates
and more favorable terms for the borrower.164 Some of those who
advocated for increased minority homeownership in the 1990s now
realize that the efforts to increase minority homeownership in the past
couple of decades did not place enough emphasis on the role that the
law could play in making homeownership for minorities more viable
and sustainable. One of these advocates now claims that legal reform
in the areas of foreclosure law and fair lending practices, among other
areas, must "become central to public policy debates" about minority
homeownership.16 5
162. Taylor, supra note 109.
163. Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53,
69-70 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the "Double
Discount", 37 FLA. Sr. U. L. REV. 589, 654-55 (2010); Shapiro, supra note 163, at 72.
165. Shapiro, supra note 163, at 71-72.
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To this end, more legal organizations committed to promoting
civil rights and social justice should consider how they can play a
meaningful role in helping minorities become homeowners in a finan-
cially sustainable way and in helping those who are homeowners
maintain their homes. At the national level, more civil rights and pub-
lic interest legal organizations should seek to participate in a proactive
way in developing and championing policy agendas that include the
legal reforms necessary to address critical housing issues impacting
minorities. Law schools that have a commitment to promoting civil
rights and social justice should consider undertaking initiatives to en-
hance in a substantial way the real estate offerings that are available
to their students, including by developing real estate certificate or con-
centration programs."'
Students who would take advantage of these enhanced real estate
offerings would be able, once in practice, to provide effective counsel
to prospective minority homeowners considering various options they
may have to finance a purchase of a home, including financing options
with complex legal terms. Many of these students also would be bet-
ter positioned once in practice than many other law graduates who did
not take many real estate-related- courses in law school to advise mi-
norities who already own homes who may be experiencing financial
problems about the legal options they may have to retain their
homes-or at least, the wealth associated with such homes. Still
others who pursued a real estate concentration in law school would be
well positioned once in practice to advise developers interested in
building affordable housing or, in some cases, could even become af-
fordable housing developers themselves. In addition, some of these
students would be in a better position than students who lack such
training in real estate law and finance to work within a few years of
graduating from law school with others on developing public policy in
the areas of housing and real estate.
166. A few years ago at the University of Wisconsin Law School, I worked with a number of
other professors, administrators, and members of the practicing bar to develop a real estate
concentration and certificate program. See Real Estate Law Concentration, U. Wis. L. SCH.,
http://law.wisc.edulacademics/courses/concentrations/realestate.html (last updated Nov. 10,
2011). Students interested in obtaining a real estate law certificate in our program must take a
number of real estate and business law courses, as well as a course at our business school that
reviews the business fundamentals of a real estate transaction. Id.
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2. Developing National Model State Statutes to Promote Greater
Economic Equality in Certain Areas of the Law
Over the course of the past several decades, thousands of minor-
ity landowners have lost their land as a result of court-ordered parti-
tion sales of property owned under the tenancy in common form of
ownership.'6 7 These partition sales have been a major source of black
land loss. Over the course of the past forty to fifty years, in an effort
to stem black land loss, law professors and public interest attorneys
have proposed many legal reforms including legal reforms to the law
governing partition of property that people own under the tenancy in
common form of ownership. However, those reform proposals as a
whole got little, if any, traction, and the legislative reform proposals
more specifically did not fare any better in state legislatures across the
country. Nevertheless, significant progress has been made on parti-
tion law reform in the past few years. Progress began to be made after
a group of lawyers was able to convince the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to form a drafting
committee in 2007 to develop a uniform act designed to reform parti-
tion law in many important ways.
In terms of law reform, NCCUSL, which is commonly known as
the Uniform Law Commission, has developed national model statutes
for possible enactment at the state level over the course of the past
121 years, making it the most prominent organization that has devel-
oped model state statutes during this period.' 6 8 The Uniform Law
Commission has promulgated more than 300 uniform acts-the termi-
nology it uses for its model state statutes that it advocates should be
adopted in their entirety without significant revision by various juris-
dictions-since its establishment.169 It is best known for promulgating
the Uniform Commercial Code, which it developed in conjunction
with the American Law Institute.17 0 NCCUSL also promulgated the
Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
167. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in
Common, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 505, 579 (2001).
168. ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAw 12-13
(1969).
169. See Frequently Asked Questions, Unif. Law Comm'n, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narra
tive.aspx?title=Frequently%20Asked%2OQuestions (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
170. Fred H. Miller & William B. Davenport, Introduction to the Special Issue on the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 45 Bus. Law. 1389, 1389 (1990).
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Act, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, among its many other uni-
form acts.171
Notwithstanding the critical role NCCUSL has played in re-
forming many state laws around the country, very few civil rights or
public interest law organizations have developed proposals requesting
the Uniform Law Commission to establish drafting committees to de-
velop uniform laws that would benefit low- to moderate-income and
minority individuals and communities. Civil rights and public interest
law organizations have done so little to develop uniform acts through
the Uniform Law Commission because most of these organizations
are unfamiliar with the Uniform Law Commission, the procedures it
uses in considering proposals to develop a uniform act, and the proce-
dures it uses once it does establish a drafting committee to develop a
uniform act. In contrast, those who represent the interests of power-
ful interest groups are quite familiar with the process that is used to
develop uniform acts, and these representatives repeatedly play a role
in the development (or sometimes in the stymieing to one degree or
another) of uniform acts from the proposal phase to the drafting
phase to the enactment phase.172
Nevertheless, a group of law professors and lawyers, including
civil rights and public interest lawyers, did work with the Section of
Real Property, Trust and Estate Law of the American Bar Association
(ABA) to develop a proposal to submit to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion in 2006 requesting the Uniform Law Commission to develop a
uniform act reforming the law of partition as that law applies to ten-
ancy-in-common property that families have owned for a long period
of time. 73 The Uniform Law Commission accepted this proposal in
171. ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs (forthcoming June 2013) (manu-
script at app. F at 1-10, on file with author).
172. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Universal Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83, 120 (1993).
173. Letter from David J. Dietrich, Co-Chair Property Preservation Task Force to Shannon
Skinner, ABA Rep. to NCCUSL Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (Nov.
27, 2006) (on file with author). The Property Preservation Task Force was a task force of the
ABA's Section of Real Property, Trust & Estate Law. See Section of Real Property, Probate &
Trust Law: 2006-2007 Leadership Directory, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 26.
The author served as one of the members of the Property Preservation Task Force and was able
to convince the co-chairs of the task force to consult with certain civil rights and public interest
lawyers who had significant experience working with poor and minority landowners in preparing
the proposal that the ABA's Section of Real Property, Trust & Estate Law sent to NCCUSL.
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2007.174 After the drafting committee spent three years working on
developing a uniform act to reform the law of partition, NCCUSL
promulgated the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA)
in 2010.' The ABA approved UPHPA in 2011 as a uniform act that
was appropriate for states to consider enacting into law.17 6 So far,
Georgia, Montana, and Nevada have enacted UPHPA into law, while
legislatures in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii and
South Carolina are currently considering it as well.17 7
The development of UPHPA was quite unusual in several impor-
tant ways from how most other uniform acts have been developed by
NCCUSL. As mentioned, it was quite unusual that civil rights and
public interest legal organizations-most of which were local and re-
gional as opposed to national organizations-played an important
role in developing the proposal that was sent to NCCUSL in the first
instance requesting NCCUSL to establish a drafting committee to de-
velop a uniform act that could be used to reform partition law. Sec-
ond, I served as the Reporter, the person tasked with the primary
responsibility for drafting a uniform act, for UPHPA, and became just
the second African American ever to serve as a Reporter on a uni-
form act project for the Uniform Law Commission. I was selected not
just because of my national reputation for being an expert scholar on
partition law and black landownership but also because of the exten-
sive outreach work I had done with, among others, the ABA and a
large number of public interest law and community-based organiza-
tions that work on property matters impacting poor and minority
communities. Third, a large part of the success we have had so far
with the act is attributable to the decision of many civil rights and
public interest legal organizations together with some community-
based organizations-organizations that for the most part had not had
174. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'R ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CON.
FERENCE MEETING IN ITS 116TH YEAR 191 (2007).
175. See Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'R ON UNIF. ST.
LAWS (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%200f%20heirs%20
property/uphpafinal_10.pdf.
176. See Approval for the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, ABA Now, http://www.
abanow.org/2011/01/109al (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
177. See Partition of Heirs Property Act, NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'R ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of%20Heirs%20Property%2Act (last vis-
ited Mar. 16, 2013).
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any history of working together in a collective way-to form an organ-
ization called the Heirs' Property Retention Coalition (HPRC). 78
This coalition actively participated in the drafting of UPHPA and
has played a very important role in working to enact UPHPA into law,
complementing the excellent enactment work NCCUSL has done. In
addition to HPRC's letter endorsing UPHPA, some individual HPRC
members have submitted letters to NCCUSL endorsing UPHPA, in-
cluding the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the
Federation of Southern Cooperatives.91 7 Finally, HPRC made a very
important decision to seek a partner at one of the country's largest
law firms who had expertise in real estate law who would serve as
HPRC's pro bono legal representative during the drafting of UPHPA.
The partner who agreed to serve as HPRC's pro bono counsel played
an indispensable role in helping HPRC advocate for reforms that
would improve the ability of those who own heirs' property to retain
their property or at least their heirs' property-related wealth.
Those of us who have worked with the American Bar Association
and the Uniform Law Commission to develop UPHPA and to get it
enacted into law hope that our example will inspire other civil rights
and public interest legal organizations to consider developing strate-
gies to pursue law reform initiatives through institutions such as the
Uniform Law Commission and other prominent institutions that work
(at least in part) on law reform, such as the various state law revision
commissions across the country and the American Law Institute.
Given the magnitude of the challenges civil rights and public interest
organizations face in addressing vital issues such as economic inequal-
ity, lawyers within these organizations should use every legal tool at
their disposal in their effort to promote social justice including tools
that have been underutilized to date.
CONCLUSION
Though reversing the trends in economic equality and intergener-
ational mobility in this country will require fundamental changes in
public policy as it relates to our tax system and educational system,
among other areas, lawyers and law schools can play an important
role in promoting greater economic equality and security for many in
178. See, e.g., HPRC News, HEIRS' PROP. RETENTION COAL., http://www.southerncoalition.
org/hprc/(last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
179. See Partition of Heirs Property Act, supra note 177.
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this country. Law schools committed to promoting social justice
should consider whether there is more they could be doing to promote
civil rights and reduce economic inequality, including by enhancing
the range of business and transactional courses and programs offered
at their schools. Efforts should be made to involve a greater number
of lawyers, whether these lawyers are public interest lawyers or law-
yers in private practice, and whether these lawyers are litigators or
transactional attorneys, in legal efforts to reduce economic inequality.
Civil rights and public interest law organizations should consider
whether there are legal strategies and tools that they have underutil-
ized to date that would help them better promote their social justice
agendas. If lawyers and legal organizations make more of an effort to
coordinate their work in addressing economic inequality with others
who are working on this issue, and if more legal tools are used in the
effort to address economic inequality, law can play a more substantial
role in promoting economic justice.
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